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ABSTRACT
Phillips, Tyler S. M.S., Purdue University, May 2020. Privacy-Preserving Facial
Recognition Using Biometric-Capsules. Major Professor: Xukai Zou.
In recent years, developers have used the proliferation of biometric sensors in
smart devices, along with recent advances in deep learning, to implement an array of
biometrics-based recognition systems. Though these systems demonstrate remarkable
performance and have seen wide acceptance, they present unique and pressing security
and privacy concerns. One proposed method which addresses these concerns is the
elegant, fusion-based Biometric-Capsule (BC) scheme. The BC scheme is provably
secure, privacy-preserving, cancellable and interoperable in its secure feature fusion
design.
In this work, we demonstrate that the BC scheme is uniquely fit to secure state-
of-the-art facial verification, authentication and identification systems. We compare
the performance of unsecured, underlying biometrics systems to the performance of
the BC-embedded systems in order to directly demonstrate the minimal effects of
the privacy-preserving BC scheme on underlying system performance. Notably, we
demonstrate that, when seamlessly embedded into a state-of-the-art FaceNet and
ArcFace verification systems which achieve accuracies of 97.18% and 99.75% on the
benchmark LFW dataset, the BC-embedded systems are able to achieve accuracies
of 95.13% and 99.13% respectively. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that the BC
scheme outperforms or performs as well as several other proposed secure biometric
methods.
11. INTRODUCTION
Through the use of biometric systems, users are able to utilize their intrinsic physiolog-
ical (face, iris, fingerprint, etc.) and behavioral (speech, gait, mobile swiping patterns,
etc.) biological traits in order to be recognized [1]. This grants the user the conve-
nience of not needing to carry with them a traditional knowledge-based or physical
object-based credentials (i.e. passwords or smart cards). Though biometrics-based
systems offer this convenience, they also present their own set of pressing security
and privacy concerns [2]. If an attacker is able to steal the biometric template of a
victim, the victim’s biometrics are forever lost to the attacker. The victim cannot
reasonably revoke and reset their physiological or behavioral traits, as they could for
a stolen password or smart card. Furthermore, through analysis of a stolen biometric
template, an attacker may be able to derive private, personal information about the
victim user, such as ethnicity, age, gender, health condition [3–5].
In paper [6], the authors propose the Biometric-Capsule (BC) scheme in order to
address these pressing security and privacy concerns. This fusion-based cancellable
biometric scheme involves the introduction of a reference subject (RS). Each user
chooses (or is assigned) an RS during enrollment. Then, in order to carry out any
biometric recognition task, a user’s sampled biometrics are securely fused with the
biometrics of their corresponding RS in order to yield a resulting BC. Through the BC
scheme’s secure fusion process, the contributions of the user and RS features toward
the resulting BC are masked. Therefore, analysis of the resulting BC does not reveal
the user or RS biometric features, even in the case most favorable to an adversary.
In this work, we embed the BC scheme into state-of-the-art facial recognition
systems which leverage recently proposed deep learning-based techniques. This allows
us to demonstrate several highly advantageous properties of the BC scheme and make
several novel contributions:
2(1) The BC scheme is interoperable in design and requires no fixed biometric sam-
pling, detection, alignment, segmentation, feature extraction, feature representation
or classification techniques in order to accommodate it. Therefore, the BC scheme
can be seamlessly embedded into existing systems which use the most current and
robust techniques as they are developed. This use of state-of-the-art techniques in
conjunction with the BC scheme addresses several performance and flexibility issues
challenging other proposed secure biometrics methods [7, 8].
(2) Through comparison of underlying systems and BC-embedded systems, we are
able to directly demonstrate the performance effects of embedding the BC scheme
into an underlying system. This minimal effect (and sometimes improvement) upon
underlying performance provides strong motivation for the use of the BC scheme to
secure state-of-the-art systems.
(3) As the BC scheme is both provably privacy-preserving and uniquely fit to
secure state-of-the-art systems, it is able to effectively address emerging user concerns
surrounding biometric technologies [9–12].
32. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, many methods have been proposed and investigated in hopes of ro-
bustly securing biometric templates. According to Jain et. al. [13], an ideal secure
biometric system should possess many attributes including: biometric template secu-
rity, cross-matching resistance, privacy-preservation and minimal negative effects on
classification performance. Two broad classes of approaches for securing biometric
templates have emerged: biometric cryptosystems (BCS) and cancellable biometrics
(CB).
2.1 Biometric Cryptosystems
BCS approaches either bind information with biometric templates or use biomet-
ric templates directly to generate keys which are then used in place of biometric
templates. Both types of approaches yield biometric-dependant public data known
as helper data. This helper data is stored by the system during enrollment and, as
a result, must preserve user privacy. Based on how this helper data is used within
the system, BCS can be split into two sub-classes of approaches: key binding and
key generation schemes. In key binding schemes, a user must provide secret infor-
mation which is combined with their biometric template in order to generate helper
data. Keys can then be derived from the resulting helper data. Fuzzy vault and
fuzzy commitment schemes, such as [14–16], are examples of key binding schemes.
In key generation schemes, helper data is derived directly from the original biomet-
ric template. As in key binding schemes, keys are derived from the resulting helper
data. Fuzzy extractor and secure sketch schemes, such as [17–19], are examples of
key generating schemes.
42.2 Cancellable Biometrics
CB approaches involve applying transformations directly to a biometric template
such that retrieving the original biometric template is computationally costly. The
altered biometric templates are then used for recognition. Then, if such a cancellable
template is stolen, the attacker cannot derive the personal information of the user.
In addition, the user can revoke, or cancel, the cancellable biometric template and
alter their biometrics differently for future recognition tasks. CB approaches can be
divided into two sub-classes: salting schemes and noninvertible transformations. In
salting schemes, users provide secret information such as a password or PIN. Their
biometric template is then transformed by an invertible function with respect to the
provided secret information. Since these transformations are typically invertible to
some extent, the secure storage of each user’s corresponding secret information be-
comes of the utmost importance. Examples of salting schemes include [20–22]. In
noninvertible transformations schemes, a biometric template is transformed using a
noninvertible (or one-way) function. Unfortunately, many noninvertible transforma-
tions systems are not provably secure, and are indeed invertible under certain condi-
tions [7]. Along with the BC scheme [6], examples of noninvertible transformations
systems include [23,24]. For both salting and noninvertible transformations schemes,
the transformations applied to biometric templates must be chosen with care. On
one hand, the transformations must conceal user biometrics if transformed templates
are compromised. Furthermore, the transformations must preserve user privacy. On
the other hand, if these transformations raise inter-class similarity or raise intra-class
variability, the performance of the biometric recognition system will suffer [1, 8].
For an extensive overview of proposed BCS and CB, their respective vulnerabilities
and benchmark results please see [7, 8, 13,25].
53. BIOMETRIC-CAPSULE SCHEME
3.1 Biometric-Capsule Generation
The BC scheme is an elegant feature fusion-based CB method. Its secure fusion
process involves three main steps which take place after feature extraction/representation
and before classification within a biometric recognition work-flow. As shown in
Fig. 3.1, the BC scheme takes two feature vectors as input, one belonging to a user
and the second belonging to the user’s corresponding RS. Using the two input feature
vectors, three steps are carried out in order to generate a BC: (1) signature extraction,
(2) key generation and (3) secure fusion. The overall BC generation workflow can be
seen in Fig. 3.1. Furthermore, the Python pseudo-code for each BC generation step
can be seen in Algo. 1. Here, we discuss each of these BC generation steps in detail.
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Fig. 3.1. Biometric-Capsule (BC) generation involving signature ex-
traction, key generation and secure fusion
63.1.1 Signature Extraction
The first step in the BC generation process is signature extraction. This step
involves extracting a lower-dimensional, representative signature from a facial feature
vector. To perform signature extraction, we use a three-level averaging method similar
to the one proposed by [26], although a different signature extraction method could
be used if the system designer wishes. In our experiments, the chosen method first
involves the reshaping of input feature vector from shape IR512 to IR32x16. Next, a
IR5x5 kernel is used to perform a padded averaging convolution. This means that an
average value of the area covered by the kernel is found and the feature matrix is
padded such that the result of the convolution is the same size as the input. Next,
the difference between the original feature matrix and the resulting convolved matrix
is found. Then, a row-wise average of the resulting matrix is obtained. Finally, the
resulting vector values are multiplied by 103, rounded to integer values and mapped
to values positive integer values through an absolute value operation to obtain the
input feature’s Z32 signature vector.
It can be seen that this signature extraction step represents a one-way function
as, given an input feature vector, x ∈ IR512, it easy to compute (as shown in Algo. 1)
a signature vector, s(x) ∈ Z32, but, given a resulting signature vector, s(x) ∈ Z32,
it is impossible to determine the feature vector, x ∈ IR512, from which the signature
vector was derived.
3.1.2 Key Generation
The second step of the BC generation process is key generation. The key gener-
ation process utilizes a feature’s extracted signature, x ∈ Z32, as input. Each of a
signature’s 32 integer values are used as seeds in a random number generator (RNG)
to generate 16 uniformly random values (for a total of 512 random values) between 0
and 1. These randomly generated values are placed into a key vector 512 (the same
shape as the initial FaceNet feature embedding). Finally, all values within the key
7are rounded and all resulting 0 values are changed to -1. As shown in Fig. 3.1 and
Algo. 1, the key generation process will finally result in a key vector of 512 values of
1 or -1, i.e. k(x) ∈ {±1}512.
It can be seen that this key extraction process does not reveal information regard-
ing the original input feature vector. This key extraction process represents another
one-way function. Given signature value seeds, x ∈ Z32, and a RNG, it is easy to
generate a set of randomly uniform values and then map them to a vector of 1 or -1,
k(x) ∈ {±1}512, but, given a set of randomly uniform values mapped to values of 1
or -1, k(x) ∈ {±1}512, it is impossible to deterministically derive the signature value
seeds, x ∈ Z32, used by the RNG to generate the set.
3.1.3 Secure Fusion
The final step of the BC generation process is the secure fusion step. From this
secure fusion step, a resulting Biometric-Capsule is obtained. Secure fusion takes
two feature vectors as input, one belonging to a user and the other belonging to the
user’s corresponding RS. The two keys generated using the two features are also used
as inputs. The user key is used to transform the RS feature through element-wise
multiplication. Likewise, the RS key is used to transform the user feature through
element-wise multiplication. Through these transformations, the contribution of the
features to the final resulting BC is masked. Finally, the altered biometrics are fused
through an unweighted addition operation to obtain a BC (as shown in Fig. 3.1 and
Algo. 1).
This Secure Fusion step can be simply represented using the following equation:
v(w, x, y, z) = w ∗ z + x ∗ y (3.1)
where w ∈ IR512 and x ∈ IR512 are the user and RS features respectively, y ∈ {±1}512
and z ∈ {±1}512 are the user and RS keys respectively, ∗ is an element-wise mul-
tiplication, + is a simple vector addition and v(w, x, y, z) ∈ IR512 is the resulting
BC.
8A few points of this secure fusion process should be noted. First, no feature
information is lost when a feature is altered through the element-wise multiplication
with a key. Since the keys used for feature alteration only contain values of 1 or -1,
feature values can only possibly be unaffected or negated. Second, no weight is given
to the user or RS features when fusion occurs. This means the altered user and RS
features contribute equally to the final, resulting BC. After a BC is generated it can
be used for any biometric recognition task.
3.2 Notable Attributes of the Biometric-Capsule Scheme
In a BC-embedded biometric recognition system, the BC scheme is used to al-
ter all biometrics sampled by the system. A BC-embedded system performs BC
fusion between feature extraction/representation and classification steps (as shown
in Fig. 4.1). Therefore, each time the user’s biometrics are sampled by the system,
the user’s biometric features are fused with the biometric features of the user’s cor-
responding RS. As a result, BCs, rather than the original user biometric features,
are used for recognition tasks. Then, if an attacker infiltrates the BC-embedded
system, BCs are compromised rather than unsecured and sensitive information di-
vulging biometric templates. Furthermore, if any security concern exists, users can
revoke compromised BCs and can use a different RS for BC generation in the future.
In previous works, [6] indicated that the BC approach has minor negative affects on
underlying iris authentication system accuracy. Furthermore, [27, 28] demonstrated
that the BC scheme could be used to secure facial authentication systems and be used
alongside deep learning techniques.
The elegant, simple design of the BC scheme yields highly advantageous prop-
erties. Rather than dictating which biometric sampling, segmentation, alignment,
feature extraction, feature representation or classification steps occur within a bio-
metric system in order to accommodate it, the BC scheme’s flexible design allows
it to instead be embedded within existing systems. This gives system designers the
9Algorithm 1: Biometric-Capsule Generation Python Pseudo-Code
1 import numpy as np
2 from scipy.signal import convolve2d
3 signature extraction (feature ∈ IR512)
4 lvl1 = convolve2d(
feature.reshape(32, 16), np.ones((5, 5))/25.,
mode =′ same′, boundary =′ wrap′)
5 lvl2 = feature.reshape(32, 16) − lvl1
6 lvl2 = np.average(lvl2, axis = 1) ∗ 1000.
7 signature = np.around(lvl2).astype(int)
8 signature = np.abs(signature)
9 return signature ∈ Z32
1 key generation (signature ∈ Z32)
2 key = np.empty((0, ))
3 for s in signature do
4 np.random.seed(s)
5 key = np.append(
key, np.random.choice(2, 16))
6 end
7 key = (key ∗ 2)− 1
8 return key ∈ {±1}512
1 secure fusion
(u feature ∈ IR512, u key ∈ {±1}512, rs feature ∈ IR512, rs key ∈ {±1}512)
2 bio capsule = u feature ∗ rs key + rs feature ∗ u key
3 return bio capsule ∈ IR512
flexibility to design an underlying biometric system how they wish, with no direct
consideration for the BC scheme. After designing an underlying system, the system
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designer can then embed the BC scheme within their system’s pipeline between fea-
ture extraction/representation and classification steps in order to secure it and to
protect the privacy of its users.
This advantageous property differs from many other secure biometric methods
which make explicit or implicit constraints upon the work-flow of an underlying sys-
tem in order to accommodate them. In principle, the BC scheme can be embedded
into any existing biometric system and utilize the system’s current biometric tech-
niques. As shown in Fig. 3.1, only the BC scheme’s secure fusion process, involving
signature extraction, key generation and feature fusion steps (which themselves are
flexible), must be embedded into the existing system. This allows for the BC scheme
to be embedded into underlying biometric systems which use the most current and
robust biometric techniques as they are developed. This is quite advantageous indeed,
as many recently proposed deep learning-based biometric techniques have been shown
to be extremely robust and accurate [29,30]. Therefore, the BC scheme can leverage
the highly discriminative features of underlying state-of-the-art systems, while pro-
viding robust security and privacy benefits, and only degrading underlying system
performance slightly. In Fig. 3.2, we illustrate the t-SNE projection [31] of FaceNet
features [32] (the most widely accepted deep learning facial feature representation
method), ArcFace features [33] (the current state-of-the-art facial feature representa-
tion method) and corresponding BCs (all generated using a single RS) of 6 similar
subjects with a few hundred images each. Note that, while a human may find it hard
to discern inter-class differences between the classes, the FaceNet and ArcFace feature
representations are able to be easily separated into distinct classes with few errors.
Furthermore, for the most part, the BC versions of the underlying features preserve
the clear separability of the classes while rearranging their relative positions. Due
to its elegant design, the BC scheme is uniquely fit to secure biometric recognition
systems which utilize these techniques.
Though the BC scheme introduces no constraints upon a system’s preprocessing,
feature extraction, or classification steps, the BC scheme does require the introduction
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of RSs. Anytime a biometric template must be generated by the system, an RS must
be retrieved by (or provided to) the system. This is because, without an RS, BC
fusion is not possible.
Fortunately, how RSs are incorporated within a BC-embedded system is quite
flexible. During enrollment, a new user is assigned (or chooses) a corresponding
RS. The RS can be made public or kept private (with no loss in privacy benefits as
shown later in this section). All users can be assigned (or choose) a unique RS, or
sets of users can be assigned (or choose) the same RS. Since user and RS biometrics
contribute equally in BC fusion, multiple users having the same RS introduces no
security concerns as we will show later in this section. Later, when presenting their
biometrics to the system in order to carry out a recognition task, the user could
provide their RS to the system in a variety of different ways. A few examples are:
• In high security scenarios, an RS could be a physical object kept by the user
and provided at recognition time. In this type of system, only a database of
registered BCs would need to be maintained by the system. Storing RSs and
information about which user(s) each RS corresponds to would not be necessary.
• A set of RSs could also be provided by the system for the user to choose from
at recognition time. In this type of system, a database of registered BCs and
RSs would need to be maintained by the system. Storing information about
which user(s) each RS corresponds to would again not be necessary.
• The system could store and automatically use the user’s corresponding RS at
recognition time. This method would provide the most convenience to the user
as they would not need to keep track of their RS. As a result, the BC scheme
would be fully-transparent to users. Despite this transparency, users would still
be protected by the BC scheme’s robust security and privacy benefits. In this
type of system, a database of registered BCs, RSs and information about which
user(s) each RS corresponds to would need to be maintained.
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Fig. 3.2. t-SNE visualization of FaceNet, ArcFace and correspond-
ing BC templates (using a single RS for BC generation) of 6 similar
looking subjects
It should be noted that the user biometric features (which are fused with cor-
responding RS features to form BCs) are not stored by any of the aforementioned
systems. Ultimately, how RSs are incorporated in a BC-embedded system is the sys-
tem designer’s choice and should reflect and enhance the use case of the underlying
biometric system.
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3.3 Security and Privacy of the Biometric-Capsule Scheme
In this work, we will consider a secure biometric template to be privacy-preserving
if it can robustly secure and mask the user biometrics which were leveraged to gen-
erate the secure biometric template. Therefore, in this context, privacy refers to the
confidentiality of unsecured biometric templates and the sensitive biometric traits
that can be derived from such unsecured templates.
In addition to being flexible in design, the BC scheme also offers robust, provably
secure and privacy-preserving benefits. Since the signature extraction, key generation
and fusion steps of the BC scheme each have one-way properties, the resulting BC
scheme can be shown to be essentially a one-way function. In paper [6], authors
formally proved many security and privacy benefits of the BC scheme. These benefits
include that the BC scheme is robust in defending against the following four types of
attacks. (1) The first type of attack is the case in which a BC is stolen and the attacker
then attempts to derive the user’s biometric features, which is impossible due to that
it will be equivalent to solving an underdetermined equation (as shown in Eq. 3.1).
(2) The next type of attack is the case in which the attacker has stolen a user’s
BC and the user’s corresponding RS. This will result in the attacker deriving two
possibilities for each value of the user’s feature vector (as they will need to guess 1 or
-1 for each value within the user’s key). This means that the number of possible user
feature vectors will grow exponentially with respect to size of the user feature vector.
In our proposed system O(2512) ≈ O(10154) possible feature vectors can be derived,
making obtaining the user’s true feature vector computationally infeasible. (3) The
third type of attack is the case in which the attacker attempts to derive the RS from
multiple stolen BCs of one or multiple users, which is to solve an underdetermined
system of equations and, thus, is impossible. (4) The final type of attack is the case
the attacker has stolen multiple BCs (where the BCs belong to several or one user)
and their corresponding RSs, which is results in many sub-cases of (2), which are
computationally infeasible. The detailed, formal proofs can be found in [6].
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4. DESIGN OF STATE-OF-THE-ART FACE
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS
In this section we propose state-of-the-art biometric recognition systems to carry out
facial verification, authentication and identification. As previously noted in Sec. 3,
the BC scheme can be seamlessly embedded within these underlying systems. Since
the BC scheme is flexible in design, we aimed only at using the most popular and
state-of-the-art techniques (particularly involving recent deep learning techniques)
while designing these underlying systems. While designing the systems, we made
no direct considerations about how the chosen techniques would work in conjunction
with the BC scheme.
The underlying verification, authentication and identification systems are quite
similar. In fact, they perform the same steps and only differ at the classification
step, as verification, authentication and identification are fundamentally different
classification problems. Biometric verification is a binary classification problem in
which one must determine if two biometric templates belong to the same person.
Biometric authentication is a binary classification problem where one must decide
if a query biometric template belongs to the enrolled subject whom it claims to
be. Biometric identification is a multi-class classification problem in which one must
determine the identity of a query biometric template given a group of enrolled users.
The enrollment and recognition work-flows used by the proposed BC-embedded
authentication systems can be seen in Fig. 4.1. Each of the proposed systems work
using three main steps: (1) preprocessing (including biometric detection, alignment
and segmentation), (2) feature extraction and representation and (3) classification.
15
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Fig. 4.1. Work-flow of the BC-embedded facial authentication system
used in our experiments.
4.1 Preprocessing
The first step of each of the systems is to perform preprocessing tasks including
biometric detection, alignment and segmentation. Biometric detection is the process
of detecting a region of interest within a biometric signal from which features can
be extracted and, in turn, can be used for recognition tasks. Alignment is then the
process of normalizing the captured biometric region of interest. Finally, segmentation
is the process of segmenting (in this case cropping) the relevant, aligned parts of the
biometric signal for later feature extraction and recognition tasks. These tasks were
accomplished through the use of detected facial bounding boxes and landmark points.
We chose to utilize the popular Multi-Task (Cascaded) Convolutional Neural Net-
work (MTCNN) method [34] within our biometric recognition systems. This widely-
accepted deep learning-based method is quite robust and out-performed other prepro-
cessing methods which we tried. This method uses a cascade of three convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) to perform detection of faces and facial landmarks. The first
CNN in the cascade, the Proposal Network (P-Net), is used to generate candidate
bounding boxes which potentially contain faces. The second CNN in the cascade, the
Refinement Network (R-Net), takes the P-Net candidate bounding boxes as input and
attempts to reject false candidates. The final CNN in the cascade, the Output Net-
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work (O-Net), takes the refined R-Net candidate bounding boxes as input, attempts
to reject more false candidates and finally outputs each remaining candidate detec-
tion along with five corresponding fitted facial landmark points (left/right eyes, tip
of the nose, left/right sides of the mouth). We were able to find and utilize an open
source implementation of MTCNN given by [35] which was trained on the WIDER
FACE [36] and CelebA [37] datasets.
We leveraged information about our experimental datasets in order to decide what
to do in the cases of multiple or no facial detections. In the case of multiple facial
detections, we decided to select the center-most face in the image as the only face
to consider in further steps within the systems’ work-flows. Any other facial detec-
tions were then ignored and not considered further. In the case where no faces were
detected, we decided to skip alignment and segmentation steps and directly forward
the entire image to the feature extraction step. These ad-hoc heuristics worked well
for our experimental setting as each image in all the experimental datasets contained
a face (typically the center-most face) to be used for recognition or verification tasks.
In other non-experimental settings, particularly in high security scenarios, it may be
more suitable to reject images which contain no or multiple detected faces.
After we retrieved the (center-most) facial detection bounding box and five cor-
responding facial landmark points, we performed alignment and segmentation. To
perform alignment, we performed an Affine transformation such that the two eye fa-
cial landmarks would be appear at a fixed location. We chose to include a 42-pixel
margin around the bounding box in order to capture additional facial features such
as chin shape, hair line, color and style, ears, etc.
4.2 Feature Extraction and Representation
The second step of the biometric recognition systems is feature extraction and rep-
resentation. We decided to implement two versions of each system, each of which uses
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a popular facial feature representation method, to demonstrate the interoperability
of the BC scheme.
4.2.1 FaceNet Feature Representation
The first version of the systems utilizes the very popular and most widely adopted
2015 FaceNet method [32]. The system first extracts facial features from a prepro-
cessed facial image using a deep Inception-ResNet-v1 architecture CNN [38]. Next,
using the FaceNet Triplet Loss [32], extracted features are then embedded into a com-
pact 512-dimensional space in which Euclidean distance directly corresponds to facial
dissimilarty (i.e. a larger distance between feature vectors directly denotes larger
facial dissimilarity).
We were able to find and utilize an open source FaceNet model given by [39] which
was trained on the CASIA WebFace dataset [40].
4.2.2 ArcFace Feature Representation
The second version of the systems utilizes the current state-of-the-art feature
representation method, the 2019 ArcFace method [33]. This version of the system
extracts facial features from a preprocessed facial image using an extremely deep 100-
layer ResNet model [41]. Next, using the ArcFace Additive Angular Margin Loss [33],
features are then embedded onto a sphere where angular distance directly corresponds
to facial dissimilarty.
The Additive Angular Margin Loss (AAML) gives the ArcFace method several
notable advantages over the FaceNet method’s Triplet Loss (TL). AAML is derived
by performing slight modifications to plain Cross-Entropy and Softmax Loss, making
it much more computationally efficient than TL which requires building triplets of
feature embeddings before TL can be computed. Furthermore, AAML contains a
margin penalty term which penalizes the correct classifications when training a model
using AAML. Through the use of this margin penalty term, AAML is able to yield
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discriminative features vectors in which the features of different subjects are separated
by easily-interpretable linear margins. For additional details regarding the two feature
representation methods please see the original papers, [32,33], or deep face recognition
survey [30].
We were able to find and utilize an open source ArcFace model given by the
ArcFace authors [35] which was trained on the MS-Celeb-1M dataset [42].
It should be noted that both the FaceNet or ArcFace feature extraction and rep-
resentation models yield 512-dimensional feature vectors. These feature vectors can
be used in BC generation as shown in Sec. 3 in a BC-embedded facial recognition
system or directly for recognition tasks in an unsecured, underlying system.
It should also be noted that the inversion of facial feature vectors, such as the
feature vectors produced by the FaceNet and ArcFace method, to their correspond-
ing facial images is an active area of research. In recent works [43, 44], researchers
have proposed effective methods which transform facial feature embeddings to fa-
cial images that visually reveal the private personal information (ethnicity, gender,
age, etc.) of users. Such inversions would not be applicable to fused BC templates.
Therefore, BC fusion is able to preserve user privacy while, at the same time, make
use of effective deep learning feature embedding techniques, such as the FaceNet and
ArcFace methods.
4.3 Classification
After extracting features from a preprocessed image, the BC-embedded system will
then carry out BC generation using the steps outlined in Sec. 3. After BC generation,
the BC-embedded system is ready to perform classification and carry out recognition
tasks. An unsecured underlying system, on the other hand, will be ready to perform
classification directly after performing feature extraction and representation. In either
case, classification will work exactly the same as the unsecured feature templates and
secured BC templates are 512-dimensional vectors.
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To perform verification, we simply compare the extracted features/BCs of two
facial images. We obtain the Euclidean distance between the features/BCs. If this
distance is greater than a predefined threshold (obtained through analysis of training
comparisons), the images are predicted as belonging to different subjects. Likewise, if
the distance between the features/BCs is equal to or below the predefined threshold,
the images are predicted as belonging to the same subject.
To perform authentication, a binary Logistic Regression (LR) classifier is trained
for each subject during enrollment. Each subject’s LR is trained with using all en-
rolled features/BCs. The features/BCs of the LR’s corresponding subject are used as
positive samples. Every other subject’s enrolled features/BCs are then used as nega-
tive samples. Given a query feature/BC and a subject the query feature/BC claims
to be, the authentication system classifies the query feature/BC using the claimed
subject’s binary LR. This results in a binary classification decision indicating whether
the query feature/BC is predicted to be the subject whom they claim to be. If the
classifier indicates the test feature/BC is the subject, the feature/BC is authenticated
by the system (or rejected otherwise).
To perform identification, a single multiclass LR model is used. All registered
features/BCs in the biometric identification system are given to the multiclass LR
for training. Query features/BCs are classified by the multiclass LR as the subject
whose registered features/BCs most closely match the query feature/BC.
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5. EXPERIMENT
We begin our experiment by comparing the performance of the proposed underlying
authentication, identification and verification systems with the performance of the
BC-embedded systems. These comparisons directly reveal how embedding the BC
scheme into an existing biometric system will affect the underlying system’s perfor-
mance. Then, we also compare the BC scheme to many popular cancellable biomet-
rics (CB) and biometric cryptosystem (BCS) approaches. These comparisons further
demonstrate the novel, advantageous attributes of the BC scheme. Overall statistics
regarding each of the experimental datasets can be seen in Table 5.1.
For the BC-embedded version of each system, we generate BC templates by fusing
any extracted user feature with a single, shared RS. Use of a single, shared RS allows
the system to automatically generate BCs without any additional input from a users
(i.e. only their sampled biometrics are still needed for recognition tasks). Therefore,
the BC scheme is highly usable and fully transparent to users. As the usability of the
single RS BC-embedded systems is equivalent to the underlying systems, comparisons
of system performances only gauge the relative effectiveness of using features verses
BCs in recognition tasks. As previously stated in Sec. 3, use of a single, shared RS
does not compromise the privacy of sensitive user information. It should be noted
though, if a unique RS is assigned to each user, kept secret by the user and presented
to the system at recognition time, the BC scheme performance is likely to outperform
the underlying system at the cost of reduced usability [28].
Before analyzing the relative performance of the BC-embedded system, the over-
head of the BC scheme should be noted. Using a Dell laptop’s 2-core Intel Core
i7-6500u CPU, generating each BC takes ˜0.012 seconds. It should be noted that
the BC generation time is substantially faster than preprocessing and feature extrac-
tion/representation steps which take ˜0.2 and ˜0.185 seconds respectively using the
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same Intel Core i7-6500u CPU. Therefore, the inclusion of the BC scheme does not
greatly affect the scalability of an underlying biometric system in terms of efficiency.
This is particularly true if the BC scheme is embedded into systems in which RS fea-
tures and keys are pre-computed. Furthermore, in terms of storage, a BC is equivalent
to an underlying feature embedding.
For each test, we report several metrics commonly used to evaluate biometric
recognition systems [1], such as: total false positive classifications (Total FP), to-
tal fall negative classifications (Total FN), total misclassifications (ERR), accuracy
(ACC), precision (PRE), recall (REC), F1-score (F1), false acceptance rate (FAR),
false rejection rate (FRR), equal error rate (EER) and area under the receiver oper-
ating characteristic curve (AUC).
Table 5.1.
Experimental Datasets Overall Statistics
Dataset Number of Subjects Number of Images
ORL [45] 10 400
Yale Faces [46] 15 165
Yale Faces B [47] 28 16,128
IMM [48] 40 240
Caltech Faces [49] 28 445
GTDB [50] 50 750
FEI [51] 200 2,800
FERET Color [52] 994 11,338
CMU (Pose) [53] 68 12,240
CMU (Illumination) [53] 68 21,216
CMU (Expression) [53] 68 3,016
LFW [54] 13,233 5,749
LFW (Subset) [54] 423 5,985
22
Table 5.2.
Verification Experiment Results
Dataset Method Total FP Total FN ACC (%) PRE (%) REC (%) F1 (%)
LFW [54]
FaceNet 38 131 97.1833 98.7071 95.6333 97.1344
FaceNet+BC 118 174 95.1333 96.0076 94.2000 95.0837
ArcFace 0 15 99.7500 100 99.5000 99.7484
ArcFace+BC 12 40 99.1333 99.5988 98.6667 99.1256
5.1 Facial Verification
For our verification experiment, we utilize the highly unconstrained, benchmark
Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset [54]. This dataset contains 13,233 im-
ages of 5,479 subjects. We compare the performance of the underlying system and
the BC-embedded system under the View 2 testing method defined for the LFW
dataset [55]. The View 2 testing method provides a predefined 10-fold cross valida-
tion split of the dataset. Each testing fold contains 300 matching and 300 mismatching
biometric template comparisons. Each training fold contains approximately 575 sub-
jects and their corresponding images. These training images can be used to generate
biometric templates which can then be used to generate pair-wise training compar-
isons. Based on the training comparisons, later test comparisons can be predicted
as matching/mismatching subject template comparisons. Therefore, this verification
experiment directly evaluates the discriminative power of the FaceNet, ArcFace and
corresponding BC templates. For reference, DeepFace authors [56], have reported the
human accuracy in LFW verification as 97.53%. The macro-average results of the
10-fold cross validation experiment can be seen in Table 5.2.
As seen in Table 5.2, the underlying FaceNet system achieves an accuracy of
97.1833%. It should be noted that this result is significantly lesser than the 99.63%
accuracy reported by the FaceNet authors as they trained their model with a private
dataset of over 200 million images [32], whereas our FaceNet model was trained using
23
a dataset of 450 thousand images [40]. The underlying ArcFace system, on the other
hand, achieves an accuracy of 99.13%, surpassing human accuracy by a significant
margin [56]. This accuracy is much more similar to the current state-of-the-art result,
99.82%, reported by the ArcFace authors [33].
The effect of the BC scheme on the underlying systems can also been seen in Ta-
ble 5.2. As one would suspect, the BC-embedded system has lesser performance than
their underlying system counterparts. One interesting observation (which the reader
may notice in the following experiments as well) is that the BC-embedded ArcFace
system is able to outperform the BC-embedded FaceNet system. Furthermore, the
BC scheme decrements the accuracy of the underlying FaceNet system more than the
underlying ArcFace system. This is likely due to the nature of the BC generation
process. As shown in Algo. 1, the BC generation process derives representative keys
from input user and RS feature vectors. As we use a fixed RS in all experiments, the
RS feature and key used in BC generation will always be constant. This will likely
lower inter-class variability and partially account for for the lesser performance of
BC-embedded systems. The use of user features and keys in BC generation must also
be considered. If the underlying user feature representation is able to produce better
intra-class compactness and inter-class variability, more discriminative user keys will
be generated during the BC generation process. Likewise, the if the underlying user
feature representation produces lesser intra-class compactness and inter-class variabil-
ity, less discriminative user keys will be generated during the BC generation process
and, as a result, further degrade the performance of the BC-embedded system. Fol-
lowing this logic, it reasonable to assume the BC scheme will have a lesser negative
impact on underlying systems if they use superior state-of-the-art biometrics tech-
niques. If lesser techniques are used, the BC scheme can be assumed to have a more
adverse effect on underlying performance.
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Table 5.3.
Authentication Experiment Results
Dataset Method Total FP Total FN ACC (%) FAR (%) FRR (%) EER (%) AUC
ORL [45]
FaceNet 1 0 99.9938 0.0064 0 0 1
FaceNet+BC 1 1 99.9875 0.0064 0.2500 0 1
ArcFace 0 0 100 0 0 0 1
ArcFace+BC 0 0 100 0 0 0 1
Yale Faces [46]
FaceNet 1 0 99.9596 0.0433 0 0 1
FaceNet+BC 0 1 99.9596 0 0.6061 0.1299 0.9999
ArcFace 0 1 99.9596 0 0.6061 0 1
ArcFace+BC 0 1 99.9596 0 0.6061 0.3030 0.9999
IMM [48]
FaceNet 11 0 99.8854 0.1175 0.0000 0.0107 0.9999
FaceNet+BC 2 11 99.8646 0.0214 4.5833 0.2350 0.9999
ArcFace 0 0 100 0 0 0 1
ArcFace+BC 0 0 100 0 0 0 1
Caltech Faces [49]
FaceNet 8 1 99.9222 0.0719 0.2247 0.2337 0.9996
FaceNet+BC 4 3 99.9395 0.0360 0.6742 0.2337 0.9999
ArcFace 1 1 99.9827 0.0090 0.2247 0.2247 0.9998
ArcFace+BC 0 2 99.9827 0 0.4494 0.2247 0.9999
GTDB [50]
FaceNet 33 0 99.9120 0.0898 0 0.0027 1
FaceNet+BC 10 5 99.9600 0.0272 0.6667 0.0599 0.9999
ArcFace 0 0 100 0 0 0 1
ArcFace+BC 0 0 100 0 0 0 1
FEI [51]
FaceNet 528 35 99.8995 0.0948 1.2500 0.8710 0.9965
FaceNet+BC 160 88 99.9557 0.0287 3.1429 1.0606 0.9965
ArcFace 223 26 99.9555 0.0400 0.9285 0.9549 0.9962
ArcFace+BC 117 37 99.9725 0.0210 1.3214 0.9508 0.9954
FERET Color [52]
FaceNet 9220 501 99.9137 0.0819 4.4188 1.6111 0.9964
FaceNet+BC 2036 1592 99.9678 0.0181 14.0414 2.0082 0.9961
ArcFace 781 491 99.9887 0.0069 4.3306 1.6671 0.9950
ArcFace+BC 74 1152 99.9891 0.0007 10.1607 2.1131 0.9939
LFW (Subset) [54]
FaceNet 2779 76 99.8872 0.1100 1.2698 0.4486 0.9997
FaceNet+BC 857 607 99.9422 0.0339 10.1420 0.9943 0.9995
ArcFace 18 8 99.9990 0.0007 0.1337 0.0671 0.9999
ArcFace+BC 2 78 99.9968 0.0001 1.3033 0.0854 0.9998
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5.2 Facial Authentication
For our authentication experiment, we performed a 5-fold cross validation experi-
ment for several datasets. As authentication is a binary classification task performed
with respect to a single enrolled subject, each query template was classified by each
subject’s binary classifier (trained using all training templates with respect to the
given subject). Therefore, the number of total classifications for each dataset was
equal to the total number of subjects times the total number of images. Furthermore,
the number of genuine authentication attempts for a dataset is then equal to the total
number of images contained in that dataset, while the number of false authentication
attempts is equal to the total number of subjects minus one times the total number of
images. The results of the authentication experiment are shown in Table 5.3. The re-
sults shown were acquired by taking the micro-average of each subject’s classification
results for a given fold and finally macro-averaging the results of the five folds.
As shown in the results, the observations made in the previous verification experi-
ment hold true. Across all experiments, the underlying ArcFace system out performs
the underlying FaceNet system in terms of equal error rate. The BC-embedded sys-
tems then raise the equal error rate of the underlying version of the systems. In
general, the FaceNet system accuracy is more adversely affected by the inclusion of
the BC scheme than the ArcFace system.
A few interesting observations should be noted. In all cases in which the ArcFace
system achieves perfect performance, the BC-embedded ArcFace system is also able
to achieve perfect accuracy. Furthermore, in many cases, the BC-embedded systems
make less total false positive classifications than their underlying system counterparts,
despite the BC-embedded systems having a greater equal error rate. This is quite
noteworthy as in most real-world scenarios false positive classifications are much more
concerning from a security and privacy standpoint than false rejections. Also, a higher
false rejection rate is a problem which can be easily remedied in a facial authentication
system as fast re-authentication attempts can automatically be made.
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Table 5.4.
Identification Experiment Results
Dataset Method Total ERR ACC (%) PRE (%) REC (%) F1 (%)
Yale Faces B [47]
FaceNet 2908 81.9693 82.6303 81.9704 82.0075
FaceNet+BC 3364 79.1419 79.5990 79.1424 79.1773
ArcFace 1519 90.5816 90.9412 90.5812 90.5755
ArcFace+BC 2069 87.1714 87.4307 87.1719 87.1496
FEI [51]
FaceNet 33 98.8214 99.1879 98.8333 98.8190
FaceNet+BC 47 98.3214 98.7429 98.3667 98.3005
ArcFace 26 99.0714 99.4690 99.0833 99.0998
ArcFace+BC 29 98.9643 99.2700 98.9667 98.9462
FERET Color [52]
FaceNet 997 91.2065 83.7165 86.2266 83.8239
FaceNet+BC 1461 87.1141 75.7137 79.4425 76.1193
ArcFace 423 96.2691 93.7746 94.5567 93.5721
ArcFace+BC 603 94.6816 90.1699 91.7753 90.1506
CMU (Pose) [53]
FaceNet 8 99.9346 99.9366 99.9346 99.9346
FaceNet+BC 11 99.9101 99.9146 99.9101 99.9102
ArcFace 4 99.9673 99.9682 99.9673 99.9672
ArcFace+BC 5 99.9592 99.9603 99.9591 99.9590
CMU (Illumination) [53]
FaceNet 7422 65.0170 71.7019 65.0158 66.6511
FaceNet+BC 7651 63.9376 66.8468 63.9350 64.6440
ArcFace 6323 70.1971 82.1605 70.1973 73.8058
ArcFace+BC 6816 67.8733 71.9017 67.8732 68.9093
CMU (Expression) [53]
FaceNet 21 99.3037 99.3956 99.3317 99.3195
FaceNet+BC 33 98.9057 99.0388 98.9300 98.9143
ArcFace 7 99.7679 99.8436 99.8048 99.8115
ArcFace+BC 6 99.8011 99.8419 99.8316 99.8277
LFW (Subset) [54]
FaceNet 151 97.4770 95.0998 96.3447 95.1583
FaceNet+BC 316 94.7201 88.2921 90.2411 88.4626
ArcFace 4 99.9332 99.9492 99.9632 99.9482
ArcFace+BC 6 99.8997 99.8872 99.8923 99.8784
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5.3 Facial Identification
For our identification experiment, we also performed a 5-fold cross validation
experiment. As facial identification involves a single multi-class classifier used for all
classification tasks, the total number of classifications performed for each dataset is
simply equal to the number of total images in the dataset. To report the experimental
results in Table 5.4, we micro-average the classification results with respect to each
subject using a one-vs-all approach and finally macro-average results of each of the 5
cross-validation folds.
The identification results follow the same overall trends as verification and authen-
tication experiments. The underlying ArcFace system is always able to outperform
the underlying FaceNet system. In general, the BC-embedded systems diminish un-
derlying system performance in such a way that is proportional to underlying system
performance. In the case CMU (Expression) dataset [53], the BC-embedded ArcFace
system actually outperforms the underlying ArcFace system, albeit by only a single
less misclassification.
5.4 Comparison with Existing Methods
We also compared the BC scheme with many popular biometric cryptosystem
(BCS) and cancellable biometrics (CB) methods. We test the proposed ArcFace BC-
embedded system using the same dataset and testing method of several popular secure
biometric methods. This allows us to compare the BC scheme’s performance against
other proposed secure biometric schemes. The results of each of these comparisons
can be seen in Table 5.5. We report our results in terms of the metric(s) used in the
original paper of the technique which we compare the BC scheme with.
The first method CB method we compared the BC scheme to was the minimum
average correlation energy (MACE) cancellable filtering based method [20]. This
method requires users to provides both their facial biometrics and a secret PIN dur-
ing enrollment. The provided PIN is used as a seed in order to generate a random
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filter. The random filter is then used to filter and encrypt the user’s sampled facial
images. Finally, the resulting encrypted facial images are is transformed into a cor-
responding MACE filter and stored by the system. At authentication time, the user
again provides their facial biometrics and secret PIN. The PIN is again used to gener-
ate a random filter which is applied to the user’s query facial image. Finally, the user’s
stored MACE filter is applied to the user’s filtered facial image. Following the appli-
cation of the MACE filter, the authors examine the resulting peak-to-sidelobe ratio
(PSR) in order to make an authentication decision. In their paper [20], the authors
perform a verification experiment using the CMU (Illumination) dataset [53]. They
report an EER of 0% which we were also able to achieve using both the BC-embedded
ArcFace system.
The second CB method we compared the BC scheme with was the Cancellable
2DPCA method proposed by [24]. The authors use of polynomial functions and co-
occurrence matrices in order to modify facial images. They then use principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) for feature extraction. The authors use the Olivetti Research
Laboratory (ORL) dataset [45] (also known as the AT&T dataset) for their exper-
iment, and report an authentication accuracy of 96%. The BC-embedded ArcFace
system was able to achieve an accuracy of 100%.
The next method we compared the BC scheme to was the BCS key binding Fuzzy
Vault based method for faces [16]. This method fuses the biometric template of a
user with a key the user must also provide. The authors perform an authentication
experiment and report a best FAR of 5.26% and a best FRR of 26%. The BC-
embedded ArcFace system was able to achieve a FAR of 0% with a FRR of 0%.
Next, we compared the BC scheme to the CB Mixing Biometrics method [23].
In many respects, this method is more similar to the BC scheme than any other
method which we compared the BC method with. The Mixing Biometrics method
uses the facial landmarks of a user facial image and the facial landmarks of a RS-
like image in order to fuse the two faces. Classification is then performed using the
fused face. Though this method is similar to the BC method in some respects, the
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BC method has clear advantages. The Mixing Biometrics method requires certain
predefined alignment steps to take place for later facial fusing. The BC requires no
fixed alignment steps. The BC approach also preserves user privacy. From a stolen
BC, an attacker cannot derive personal information (such as gender, ethnicity, age,
etc.) about the victim, even when the RS image is also stolen. Unfortunately, with
Mixing Biometrics fused faces, it would not be difficult for attackers to derive per-
sonal information of the user. The personal information (such as gender, ethnicity,
age, etc.) of the user is clearly visible in the Mixing Biometrics fused face template.
Furthermore, if the attacker obtained the fused face and the RS-like image used for
facial fusion in the Mixing Biometrics method, the attacker would certainly be able
to derive the personal information of the victim user by reversing the facial fusion
process. The Mixing Biometrics authors use the IMM face dataset [48] for an iden-
tification experiment, as the IMM face dataset has pre-annotated facial landmarks.
The authors report an EER of 6%. The BC-embedded ArcFace system was able to
achieve an EER of 0%.
The final method we compared the BC scheme to was the CB Secure Computation
of Face Identification method (SCiFI) [57]. This method uses a secure multi-party
computation of Eigenfaces [58] in order to identify faces. Authors perform an identifi-
cation on the CMU (Pose) dataset [53]. The authors report a (rank one) true positive
rate of 80%. The BC-embedded ArcFace system was able to achieve (rank one) true
positive rates of 100%.
Each of these comparisons demonstrates that the BC is able to perform as well or
outperform other proposed secure biometric methods. It should be noted that many of
the compared schemes use very constrained datasets for their experiments. Had these
methods reported results using an unconstrained dataset, like the LFW dataset [54],
these methods’ performances would likely be very poor in comparison with the BC
scheme’s performance. In addition to the BC’s superior performance, the BC pro-
vides many additional advantages over the compared methods. For instance, the BC
scheme is flexible in design unlike most of the compared methods which assume fixed
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preprocessing, feature extraction and/or classification techniques. This prevents the
compared methods from using state-of-the-art deep learning-based methods. The BC
is also provably secure and privacy preserving unlike some of the compared methods.
Table 5.5.
Comparison of the Biometric-Capsule Scheme with Popular Methods
Method Dataset Domain Metric Result
MACE [20]
CMU PIE (Subset) [53] Verification EER
0%
ArcFace+BC 0%
Cancellable 2DPCA [24]
ORL [45] Authentication ACC
96%
ArcFace+BC 100%
Fuzzy Vault [16]
ORL [45] Authentication FAR, FRR
5.26%, 23%
ArcFace+BC 0%, 0%
Mixing Biometrics [23]
IMM [48] Identification EER
6%
ArcFace+BC 0%
SCiFI [57]
CMU PIE (Subset) [53] Identification TPR
80%
ArcFace+BC 100%
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6. FUTURE WORK
One future work direction is investigating the intraclass and interclass similarity and
variation of BCs formed by a composition of a user’s biometrics fused with the biomet-
rics of multiple RSs. In the proposed BC scheme, if the BC database is compromised,
users are able to securely revoke their compromised BCs and register new ones. If
users could instead fuse their compromised BCs with an additional, secondary RSs,
the new BCs could then be used for future recognition tasks. In the future, users
would simply need to form BCs using their biometrics and their first RS and then
fuse the resulting BC with the new, secondary RS. We need to investigate the perfor-
mances of systems which use such multi-RS BC compositions in order to determine
their usability.
One other future work direction is to investigate the use of dynamic RSs. In the
currently proposed scheme, an RS is a fixed facial image. It may, in fact, be possible
to use a subject RS rather than an image as a RS. For example, rather than using a
fixed image of George Washington as an RS, George Washington the subject could be
used as an RS and any image of George Washington could be used for BC fusion. The
usability of dynamic RSs would most likely depend on the intra-class compactness of
the feature vectors extracted from the RS subject’s images.
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7. SUMMARY
We have shown that the BC method can be used to effectively secure biometrics
systems used for for facial verification, authentication and identification. In each of
these domains, the BC scheme can be embedded into existing biometric recognition
systems with virtually no constraint on how the underlying system operates. This
flexible design of the BC scheme allowed us to embed the BC scheme in recognition
schemes which used state-of-the-art deep learning techniques. The BC scheme offers
the underlying system robust security and privacy benefits while, at the same time,
affecting the underlying system’s performance in a predictable manner. Furthermore,
we have shown that the BC system performs as well as or outperforms many popular
secure biometric techniques.
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